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Disclosure of Banks’ Stress-Test Results
Summary
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the Federal Reserve conduct an annual stress test on large bank holding
companies (BHCs) to ensure they have sufficient capital to withstand losses from adverse economic
conditions. Eighteen BHCs were subjected to a stress test this year. The stress tests operate on the assumption
that providing more information will help impose more discipline on financial institutions. However, the
policy of disclosure has some significant disadvantages that need to be addressed in order for financial
regulation to be effective.
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This is especially important for prevent-
ing the negative spillovers that these losses 
can have on the rest of the economy via 
contagion across financial institutions 
and the reduction in loans to the real 
economy. Consequently, the United States 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which requires 
the Federal Reserve to conduct an annual 
stress test of large bank holding companies 
(BHCs) to evaluate whether they indeed 
have sufficient capital. 
Examinations of large banks by regula-
tors are not new. Large banks in the United 
States have been subject to continuous 
on-site examinations for many years, and 
these on-site examinations have been a key 
input into a bank’s CAMELS rating, which 
is a score between 1 and 5 used to classify a 
bank’s overall condition. The newly required 
stress tests are different in that they focus 
on the ability of banks to withstand 
severely adverse macroeconomic scenarios. 
Moreover, their results are intended to be 
disclosed publicly. 
The results of the most recent stress 
tests were disclosed publicly in March 
2013.1 The disclosure of the results is an 
important part of the newly required stress 
tests in the eyes of the Federal Reserve, as 
emphasized in the press release announcing 
the results: “The Federal Reserve believes 
that disclosure of stress test results provides 
valuable information to market participants 
and the public, enhances transparency, and 
promotes market discipline.”2 At the same 
time, this disclosure policy is quite contro-
versial and has generated strong concerns in 
the financial industry. For example, in a Wall 
Street Journal article from March 5, 2012, 
the Clearing House Association expressed 
the view that making all this informa-
tion public “could have unanticipated and 
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potentially unwarranted and negative con-
sequences to covered companies and U.S. 
financial markets.” In this policy brief, I will 
outline some of these potentially unwar-
ranted and negative consequences, which 
I believe are indeed important to consider 
when designing disclosure policy. 
The structure of this policy brief is as 
follows: First, I provide a short overview of 
the nature of the newly required stress tests 
and the meaning of their results. Then, I 
discuss the tradeoffs involved in setting the 
level of disclosure, emphasizing some of the 
disadvantages of a policy of greater disclo-
sure, which are often not well understood. 
Finally, I conclude with a few suggestions 
on how to revise the disclosure policy to 
alleviate some of the identified problems. As 
I explain below, understanding the implica-
tions of the disclosure policy is crucial for 
alleviating financial fragility, for providing 
proper incentives to banks, and for enabling 
efficient production and aggregation of 
information about financial institutions.
stress tests followinG 
the DoDD-frank act 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal 
Reserve to conduct an annual stress test 
on large BHCs and all nonbank financial 
companies designated by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for 
Federal Reserve supervision. The Federal 
Reserve adopted rules implementing these 
requirements in October 2012. Under the 
rules, 18 BHCs were part of the Dodd-
Frank Act supervisory stress tests this year 
(DFAST 2013). They are: Ally Financial 
Inc.; American Express Company; Bank 
of America Corporation; The Bank of New 
York Mellon Corporation; BB&T Corpora-
tion; Capital One Financial Corporation; 
Citigroup, Inc.; Fifth Third Bancorp; The 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan 
Chase & Co.; KeyCorp; Morgan Stanley; 
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; 
Regions Financial Corporation; State Street 
Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S. 
Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company. 
Their total assets range from $89 billion 
(KeyCorp) to $2.4 trillion ( JPMorgan 
Chase & Co) as of March 2013. 
In conducting the stress tests, the 
Federal Reserve considered three macro-
economic scenarios – baseline, adverse, and 
severely adverse – and examined the impli-
cations they would have on each individual 
BHC. The published results are for the 
severely adverse economic scenario. 
The severely adverse scenario includes 
trajectories for 26 variables: 14 variables 
that capture economic activity, asset prices, 
and interest rates in the U.S. economy 
and financial markets, plus three variables 
(real GDP growth, inflation, and the U.S./
foreign currency exchange rate) in each of 
four countries or country blocs (the euro 
area, the United Kingdom, developing Asia, 
and Japan). This scenario is not meant to 
be a projection for the future, but rather a 
reflection of a very bad possible economic 
shock of the kind that was experienced in 
the recent financial and economic crisis. 
In this scenario, real GDP in the United 
States declines nearly 5 percent between 
the third quarter of 2012 and the end of 
2013; the unemployment rate rises to 12 
percent; the four-quarter percent change in 
the consumer price index (CPI) decelerates 
to 1 percent; equity prices fall more than 50 
percent; the equity market volatility index 
increases from 21 to 70; real estate prices 
decline by more than 20 percent; and the 
euro area, the United Kingdom, and Japan 
fall into recession, while developing Asia 
experiences below-trend growth.
For each BHC, the stress test examines 
the effect of the severely adverse economic 
shock on net income and losses, taking into 
account the exposures of the BHC and its 
business. In order to conduct this analysis, 
the Federal Reserve relies on input from the 
BHCs and on analytical models that deter-
mine the effect of the shock on the income 
and losses of the bank. Combining the 
results on income and losses with assump-
tions on capital distribution policy, the test 
generates the final output, which is the 
effect of the severely adverse shock on the 
bank’s capital ratios, based on different defi-
nitions of capital ratios. The four different 
ratios are the ratio of the common equity 
component of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted 
assets (the tier 1 common ratio), the ratio 
of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (the 
tier 1 capital ratio), the ratio of total regula-
tory capital to risk-weighted assets (the 
total risk-based capital ratio), and the ratio 
of tier 1 capital to average assets (the tier 1 
leverage ratio). 
Generally speaking, when a bank’s 
capital ratios are projected to drop below 
a certain threshold following the severely 
adverse economic shock, that bank is 
considered to have not “passed” the stress 
test. Such a bank is expected to limit 
capital distributions or raise more capital 
to be better prepared for adverse economic 
shocks. In general, banks differ from each 
other in the type of loans they make and 
the exposures of these loans to the assumed 
macroeconomic scenarios. Also, they dif-
fer in their capital buffers and how these 
buffers are maintained in light of planned 
capital distributions. Hence, some banks 
may fail while others may pass depending 
on these different business practices and 
capital structures. 
Overall, the newly required stress tests 
are an important part of the post-crisis 
regulatory effort to maintain a sound finan-
cial system that is less prone to the fragility 
experienced in 2008. Constantly thinking 
of adverse economic shocks and examining 
whether large financial institutions have 
sufficient capital to endure such shocks is a 
very useful exercise to prevent the negative 
spillovers from financial institutions’ losses 
in bad times to the rest of the economy via 
contagion across financial institutions and 
the reduction in loans to the real economy. 
While the current framework for the 
stress tests is a very good first step, it has 
its weaknesses. One major difficulty is that 
the stress tests only consider three sce-
narios (focusing on the most adverse one). 
1   They are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents 
press/bcreg/20130307a.htm. 
2   http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/executive-
summary.htm.
3   “Should Banks’ Stress Test Results Be Disclosed? An Analysis of the 
Costs and Benefits” (2012). Available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.
edu/~itayg/Files/stresstests.pdf. 
4   For example, the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury is coordinating efforts to analyze and improve stress 
tests. Some work in this direction can be found in the OFR’s working 
paper series: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Pages/
working-paper-series.aspx.
These scenarios are heavily influenced by 
past events, but as we know, future events 
can take a wholly different form; there is 
room to analyze many more scenarios than 
just the three that are examined currently. 
Considering a wider array of scenarios 
that could emerge from recent economic 
developments would improve the abil-
ity of the tests to identify weak spots in 
the financial system. Another difficulty is 
related to the ability to capture systemic 
risks and general-equilibrium effects in the 
current framework. As we saw in the recent 
crisis, problems are aggravated by equilib-
rium forces, as the shocks to some institu-
tions might bring down other institutions. 
Developing a framework that captures the 
combined effects on all banks, taking into 
account their relations with each other and 
with the rest of the economy, is a major 
challenge that academics and policymakers 
need to address in the years to come.
The focus of this policy brief, however, 
is not on these general weaknesses in the 
framework under which stress tests are 
conducted, but on the important angle of 
the disclosure of the results. I now turn to 
discuss this issue.
the traDeoffs involveD in 
DesiGninG the Disclosure 
Policy
The last round of stress tests described 
above involved a high level of disclosure 
on each individual BHC. For each BHC, 
the four projected capital ratios under the 
severely adverse scenario were disclosed 
publicly, alongside details on projected net 
income and projected loan losses by type of 
loan (First-lien mortgages, domestic; Junior 
liens and HELOCs, domestic; Commer-
cial and industrial; Commercial real estate, 
domestic; Credit cards; Other consumer; 
Other loans). Overall, the results suggest 
that all BHCs, with the exception of Ally 
Financial – the former finance affiliate of 
General Motors, owned by the U.S. govern-
ment since the financial crisis – have suf-
ficient capital to endure the severely adverse 
shock that served as the basis for the test.
The benefit of disclosure is very well 
understood. Providing more information 
to market participants enables the market 
to prepare for the consequences of large 
economic shocks, and this, in turn, disci-
plines financial institutions. For example, 
if a financial institution is found to be 
unprepared for a large economic shock, then 
market participants will limit their exposure 
to this financial institution. This will force 
the financial institution to take actions to 
improve its capital positions in order to 
regain the confidence of market partici-
pants. The basic idea is that more informa-
tion is always beneficial, as it allows market 
participants to take more efficient decisions 
in their interactions with financial institu-
tions, and thus encourages greater discipline 
among financial institutions.
However, recent academic literature 
has pointed out that disclosure has some 
significant disadvantages. These can be par-
ticularly relevant in the case of banks’ stress 
tests results. Such disadvantages are often 
not fully understood and appreciated in the 
debate on disclosure, and so it is important 
to highlight and explain them. In a recent 
paper that I co-authored with Haresh 
Sapra, we review this literature, describing 
in detail the disadvantages of disclosure and 
their implications for the question of stress 
test disclosure.3 Here, I draw on this review 
to describe the main policy insights. The 
interested reader can refer to this paper for 
fuller analysis and a list of references. 
Broadly speaking, the disadvantages 
of disclosure can be classified into three 
groups:
i. aDverse effects on the 
ex-Post Behavior of Market 
ParticiPants 
If an individual market participant needs to 
make a decision, this decision will be more 
efficient when there is access to more infor-
mation. This, however, is not necessarily the 
case in the presence of many market partici-
pants that exert externalities on each other. 
Market participants might put excessive 
weight on public information, even if it is 
less precise than their own private informa-
tion, just because they know that the public 
information is available to all of them. 
Specifically, in the context of banks, a piece 
of bad news that is made public via the dis-
closure of stress test results might trigger an 
inefficient run on a bank that does not pass 
the test. Market participants, knowing that 
the negative results were observed by all, 
will rush to withdraw money from the bank, 
even if their own private information is not 
so negative. Hence, the results of stress tests 
that are made public might get more than 
their fair weight in market participants’ 
decisions, generating adverse economic 
outcomes. This problem is particularly 
severe if the stress test results are noisy, e.g., 
if the data used in the stress test are not suf-
ficiently rich to determine precisely the risk 
faced by the bank, thus generating predic-
tions that are not perfect.
ii. aDverse effects on the 
ex-ante Behavior of Market 
ParticiPants 
Stress tests conducted by the Federal 
Reserve provide one source of informa-
tion about banks. There are many other 
sources of information that find their way 
into financial markets. Generally speaking, 
speculators in financial markets produce 
and trade on information on banks; this 
information finds its way into market prices. 
This is why regulators are known to rely 
on market prices of bank securities when 
deciding on various policy steps. The prob-
lem is that when regulators disclose their 
own information ex post by publishing stress 
test results, they crowd out other sources 
of information. This is because specula-
tors’ incentives to produce information on 
individual banks and trade on it might be 
weakened when they know that some of 
this information already is slated to find its 
way to the markets via the disclosure made 
by the Federal Reserve.
“Disclosure has undeniable 
benefits in promoting infor-
mativeness and market disci-
pline. However, one should 
be mindful of the unintended 
consequences.”
iii. aDverse effects on the 
ex-ante Behavior of financial 
institutions 
Banks that know that their performance in 
a stress test will become public informa-
tion might adjust their behavior ex ante in 
an inefficient way. Such inefficiencies may 
come in different forms. For example, banks 
may be reluctant to provide information to 
the Federal Reserve if they know that this 
information will become public. Since the 
Federal Reserve depends on banks’ informa-
tion for the stress tests, this could reduce 
the precision and effectiveness of stress 
tests. Banks also might try to ‘game’ the 
system by adjusting their exposures in a way 
that will enable them to pass the stress test 
but will not necessarily make them less risky 
or more efficient. This is related to the fact 
that stress tests identify only a limited num-
ber of scenarios, so banks can learn how to 
appear healthy in particular scenarios while 
not minimizing overall risk or maximizing 
overall value.
iMPlications for the 
Disclosure of stress 
tests results
Should we conclude from the above discus-
sion that disclosure of banks’ stress test 
results is undesirable? The answer to this 
question is simple: No. Disclosure has unde-
niable benefits in promoting informativeness 
and market discipline. However, one should 
be mindful of the unintended consequences 
of disclosure, and perhaps limit the extent 
of disclosure to mitigate these unintended 
consequences. 
For example, instead of disclosing 
BHC-specific information, as described 
above, another possibility is to disclose only 
aggregate information—say, total expected 
losses by loan type for a group of banks, or 
average expected capital ratios for a group 
of banks. Disclosing aggregate information 
can help avoid the unintended consequences 
highlighted in the previous section. Aggre-
gate results are more precise and therefore 
are less likely to trigger inefficient runs on 
individual banks. The disclosure of aggre-
gate results will not crowd out the incen-
tives of speculators to produce and trade 
on bank-specific information. And the fact 
that aggregate results are disclosed will not 
lead banks to restrict the information they 
provide or to try to game the system. Of 
course, disclosing only aggregate informa-
tion has a cost, as it does not allow for the 
benefits of microprudential regulation. Yet, it 
allows the Federal Reserve to create benefits 
for macroprudential regulation, i.e., regula-
tion aimed to promote the stability of the 
financial system as a whole—which, after all, 
is the main motivation for having stress tests 
in the first place. 
But, there are also ways to disclose 
bank-specific information and alleviate the 
unintended consequences. To address the 
possibility of runs following a bad result 
for an individual bank, it is important to 
identify the banks that are particularly 
susceptible to runs – those with a severe 
mismatch between liquid liabilities and 
illiquid assets – and to be particularly cau-
tious in disclosing information about them. 
Moreover, accompanying the disclosure of 
a bad performance on a stress test with a 
clear plan on how to fix the problem and 
improve the capital positions of the bank 
will alleviate the concerns of the market and 
make a run less likely. To avoid crowding out 
information production by market partici-
pants, the Federal Reserve can identify the 
dimensions on which the market is likely 
to provide information of higher quality 
than the regulatory stress tests and avoid 
disclosing information on these dimensions. 
To prevent incentive problems at the banks, 
and to make sure that they don’t game the 
system and adjust their balance sheets just 
to pass the test, it is important that banks 
don’t know ex ante what are the parameters 
and assumptions on which the stress test 
will focus. In particular, running multiple 
scenarios will make it more difficult for 
banks to do ‘window dressing’ in preparation 
for a stress test.
Above all, improving the quality and 
precision of the stress test will go a long way 
in mitigating the unintended consequences 
of disclosure. When very precise informa-
tion is being disclosed, those problems are 
less worrying. As mentioned above, two 
ways to improve the quality and precision 
of stress tests results would be to consider a 
larger variety of economic scenarios and to 
account for systemic risk and general-equi-
librium effects. Current research conducted 
in academia and in policy institutions is 
aimed at improving stress tests analysis in 
these dimensions and others.4 For example, 
considering systemic risk and general-
equilibrium effects requires understanding 
the interconnections across banks and how 
they are affected in times of crisis. This is 
a task that is now on the agenda of many 
researchers. In addition, researchers are 
thinking of ways to come up with coherent 
scenarios and incorporating them into stress 
tests to improve the ability of these tests to 
spot problems in the financial system. In 
the interim, however, revising the disclosure 
policy in the ways described above can help 
mitigate the potential negative consequences 
of publicly divulging the stress test results of 




Federal Reserve conduct an annual stress 
test on large bank holding companies 
(BHCs) to ensure they have sufficient capital 
to withstand losses from adverse economic 
conditions. Eighteen BHCs were subjected 
to a stress test this year.
•	 The	stress	tests	consider	three	economic	
scenarios—baseline, adverse, and severely 
adverse—and the results for the severely 
adverse scenario are disclosed publicly by 
the Federal Reserve, on the assumption that 
providing more information will help impose 
more discipline on financial institutions.
•	 However,	the	policy	of	disclosure	has	some	
significant disadvantages. It can increase the 
likelihood of a run on any bank that does not 
pass the test. It can crowd out other sources 
of information on banks. And it can motivate 
banks to “game” the system by fixing their 
balance sheets to appear financially sound 
without actually being so.
•	 While	disclosure	is	still	a	beneficial	policy,	it	
should be revised to address these disadvan-
tages, while the quality and precision of the 
tests themselves also should be improved.
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